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CLIMATE CHANGE, CORPORATE STRATEGY, AND
CORPORATE LAW DUTIES
Perry E. Wallace*

INTRODUCTION
Although greenhouse-gas (“GHG”) management now ranks
among the world’s great challenges, this status did not obtain
instantly—or easily.
Today, however, reservations about the
1
validity of global warming as a major threat are fading. They are
fading, appropriately, as rapidly as some ice sheets and glaciers are
2
melting. Indeed, the steady flow of new, compelling evidence joins
an already considerable base of scientific, economic, and other
3
certainties about the subject.
The result of this evolution in climate-change certainty has been
major change of global dimensions. In notable ways, the structures
and the functions of governmental, economic, and social institutions
around the world are now being revised. Moreover, these revisions
typically derive from one model or another of a carbon-constrained
4
planet.
Corporations, because of their past and continuing roles in
creating the problem, will be substantially affected by emerging
market and regulatory cultures. “The consequences [of these
market and regulatory dynamics] are not confined to ‘obvious’
sectors such as power generation, transport and heavy industry;
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law at American University.
Director, JD/MBA Dual Degree Program. JD, Columbia University, 1975.
B.Engr., Vanderbilt University, 1970.
1. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, UNEP YEARBOOK 2009, at 21
(Catherine McMullen & Thomas Hayden eds., 2009) (“Climate change has long
since ceased to be a scientific curiosity . . . . It is the major, overriding
environmental issue of our time . . . .”).
2. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Satellites
Show Arctic Literally on Thin Ice (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.nasa.gov
/home/hqnews/2009/apr/HQ_09-079_Sea_ice_thins.html (“In recent years, Arctic
sea ice has been declining at a surprising rate.”).
3. UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 1, at 22 (“[S]carcely a
week passes without new research appearing in peer-reviewed literature and
news reports that adds to the story.”).
4. See NICHOLAS STERN, U.K. TREASURY, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW (2007); see also EUR. COMM’N, EU ACTION AGAINST
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EUROPEAN CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME (2006),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/eu_climate_change
_progr.pdf (describing European Union actions to address climate change).
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virtually every company’s activities, business models and strategies
5
will need to be completely rethought.”
This Article explores the question of whether corporate- and
6
securities-law duties can (or will in the future) play a role in
influencing the rapidly growing movement toward corporate
strategic planning for GHG management. Part I of the Article
discusses corporate strategic-planning methodologies for GHG
management. This Part describes the basic features of corporate
approaches to developing and implementing strategies, policies, and
practices. Important here are the risks, and also the opportunities,
facing corporations and their stewards. Part II then evaluates the
potential applicability of corporate- and securities-law provisions
that might appear to be implicated in climate-change corporate
strategic planning and implementation.
I. STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR CORPORATE MANAGEMENT OF
GREENHOUSE GASES
A. Corporate Strategy Development for GHG Management: The
Central Role of Risk
Understanding the wisdom of timely action, some corporate
leaders have developed their own strategies for GHG management,
and certain common features are emerging. One highly respected
approach, for example, is the one set forth in Andrew J. Hoffman’s
7
Reflecting basic features common to other
Carbon Strategies.
formulations, Carbon Strategies presents a road map consisting of
three interactive stages that altogether comprise eight specific steps.
“Stage One” of the method requires that the company develop a
“climate strategy.” This includes (1) assessing the emissions profile,
(2) gauging risks and opportunities of GHG impacts, (3) evaluating
action options for addressing these impacts, and (4) setting goals
8
and targets. “Stage Two” of the method requires that the company
focus inwardly by (1) developing financial mechanisms and (2)
9
engaging the organization. “Stage Three” of the method requires
that the company focus outwardly by (1) formulating policy
10
strategies and (2) managing external relations.
In the initial assessment, a company must ascertain whether a
scientifically demonstrated general risk is in fact actual, or at least
5. Rory Sullivan, Introduction to CORPORATE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 2, 3 (Rory Sullivan ed., 2008); see also ANDREW J. HOFFMAN & JOHN G.
WOODY, CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT’S YOUR BUSINESS STRATEGY? 1 (2008).
6. The term “corporate law” will generally refer to both state corporate
law and federal securities law, unless one particular body of law is expressly
made the subject of discussion.
7. ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, CARBON STRATEGIES (2007).
8. Id. at 10–32.
9. Id. at 33–47.
10. Id. at 48–62.
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imminent, and substantial as to that specific company. Where the
answer is in the affirmative, the company must then decide what to
11
do. The following discussion focuses on specific material climatechange risks posed for certain industries, based on available
information and assessments.
B. Specific Actual or Imminent Risks Facing Certain Industries:
Opportunities and Competitive Advantage
Of the various risks that attend climate change, physical,
regulatory, and litigation risks are the most plausible candidates for
potential applicability of the corporate and securities laws.
1.

Physical Risk

Companies may face physical consequences of climate change.
These include weather-related events such as increased storms,
floods, droughts, strong winds, heat, forest fires, variations in water
12
availability, and damage to vulnerable properties on coastlines.
Such impacts create the potential for destruction of property,
increased insurance premiums, asset devaluation, heat-related
illnesses and diseases, enforced relocation, and increased commodity
prices. Affected companies would need to conduct thorough risk
assessments as well as invoke adequate risk-management
13
techniques and devices.
2.

Regulatory Risk

Climate change is increasingly viewed as a serious market
failure that requires government intervention. These interventions
may consist of (1) traditional measures (such as permit or energyefficiency requirements) or (2) market-based measures (such as
14
carbon taxes, emissions-trading schemes, and fuel tariffs).
Ironically, what is clearer to most nonexperts than the validity of
the science is the inevitability of regulation. Nevertheless, this
inevitability poses one threshold choice for companies: not whether
to prepare, but when and how to prepare. Indeed, the corporatestrategy questions, because of the still-pervasive ignorance about
climate change (not to mention political dynamics), are being driven

11. See id. at 10–32.
12. See Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, No.
4-547, at 7, 28–32 (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf [hereinafter SEC Petition]; Tom Walsh, Climate
Change: Business Risks and Solutions, RISK ALERT, Apr. 2006, at 1, 2–6,
available
at
http://global.marsh.com/risk/climate/climate/documents
/climateChange200604.pdf.
13. See Walsh, supra note 12, at 14–31.
14. See, e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 313–18
(1998).
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15

Litigation Risk

With increased certainty about climate-change science and
impacts, and with an expanding field of regulatory mandates,
litigation is becoming more of a credible threat. At the same time,
the question of the risks created by climate-change litigation is
complex. Numerous variables render attempts at describing these
16
risks a “precarious venture.” Nevertheless, litigation is a dynamic
that corporate planners must include in their strategic-planning
calculus.
II. CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
A.

Fiduciary-Duty Law

Many environmental advocates now assert that substantial
certainty about the climate-change threat imposes a “fiduciary duty”
on corporate directors and officers to take aggressive ameliorative
action.
The following discussion examines these contentions
through the prism of Delaware case law.
1.

The Fiduciary Duty of Oversight and Monitoring

a.
The Legal Framework: Is the Framework Evolving?
Corporate directors can be held personally liable for “an
unconsidered failure . . . to act in circumstances in which due
17
attention would . . . have prevented [a] loss.” Thus pronounced the
Delaware Court of Chancery in In re Caremark International Inc.
18
Derivative Litigation. Caremark is generally viewed as having set
forth not only a narrow, fiduciary-protective standard of review
(“bad faith”) but also an expanded scope of fiduciary oversight
19
The court enlarged the scope of director
responsibility.
responsibility beyond the more minimalist “red flag” test of Graham
20
The Caremark opinion
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.
endorsed information and reporting systems and controls as

15. See, e.g., Nicholas DiMascio, Note, Credit Where Credit Is Due: The
Legal Treatment of Early Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions, 56 DUKE L.J.
1587, 1587–90 (2007).
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.c.
17. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996) (emphasis omitted).
18. Id.
19. See CORPORATE LAW STORIES 331–46 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
20. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 129–31 (Del.
1963); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley:
Revisiting Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J.
CORP. L. 949, 953 (2006); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith,
32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 752–53 (2007).
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21

oversight tools (and defenses).
Nevertheless, liability in any particular instance is not a given:
“[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish
22
the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.” A
claim of this type, therefore, is “possibly the most difficult theory in
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a
23
judgment.”
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Stone v. Ritter, approved the
chancery court’s Caremark decision, including the latter court’s
24
The Stone
endorsement of information and reporting systems.
court held that such a “conscious disregard for their responsibilities”
of oversight and monitoring amounts to a breach of the directors’
duty of loyalty, at least to the extent they did not act in “good
25
faith.” In such instances, as other courts have noted, the directors
must have been “conscious of the fact that they were not doing their
26
They must have acted with “bad faith—because their
jobs.”
27
indolence was so persistent.”
Notwithstanding these difficulties of pleading and proof posed
by the law governing a claim of oversight failure, some
commentators have wondered whether certain developments over
the years may cause courts to hold directors to a higher level of
scrutiny:
(1) The Caremark court itself noted the Delaware courts’
28
increasing emphasis on the importance of the board function,
commented that the requirement of a fully informed board is so
29
basic as to be “elementary,” and spoke approvingly of the emphasis
on corporate information and reporting systems in the federal
30
sentencing guidelines.
(2) The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) increased the
scrutiny on public companies and their fiduciaries.
While
technically, of course, SOX is federal law, many perceive a follow-on
effect
at
the
state-court
level—as
Caremark
itself
31
illustrates/symbolizes.
21. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969–70.
22. Id. at 971.
23. Id. at 967.
24. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).
25. Id. at 370.
26. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003).
27. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
28. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount
Commc’ns Inc. S’holders’ Litig.), 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)).
29. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
30. Id. at 969–70.
31. See Marc Gunther, Boards Beware!, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 171,
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(3) Numerous experts believe that “[i]n the context of the
current global financial crisis and the swooning global
economy . . . boards and companies must be mindful of the
possibility that courts will apply new standards, or interpret
existing standards, to increase board responsibility for risk
32
management.”
The following discussion considers both factual and legal
considerations in analyzing the fiduciary duty to respond to climatechange business risks.
b. Monitoring GHG Impacts and Regulatory Developments:
What Facts and Events Could Trigger a Duty of Oversight? And Is
Corporate Law Really Evolving? Recent Delaware case law hardly
bodes well for the prospect that the courts will be driving strict
corporate-governance oversight of climate-change business risks. In
re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation aptly supports
33
this point.
In Citigroup, shareholders sued derivatively, charging certain
current and former directors and officers with failure to perform
their oversight and management duties relative to the company’s
involvement in the subprime-mortgage market. The company’s
dealings in complex financial instruments through its Securities &
Banking Unit had led to significant losses that in turn plunged the
34
company into financial crisis.
The plaintiffs asserted that the fiduciaries should have acted in
the face of several “red flags” that posed significant business risk.
These included (1) specific, negative developments in the housing
and subprime-credit markets, (2) predictions of doom in these
markets by eminent experts such as economist Paul Krugman and
organizations such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board,
(3) specific instances of substantial distress or failure on the part of
firms engaged in similar market activities, and (4) specific instances
of substantial distress or failure of financial derivative instruments
35
linked to those markets.
In ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss the derivative
176 (“It would not be unreasonable to assume that the Delaware courts are
responding to the Enron and WorldCom headlines and the intrusion, so to
speak, of the federal government into the internal governance of corporations.”
(quoting former Delaware Chancellor William Allen)); see also Lisa M. Fairfax,
Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty
Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 415–20 (2005) (“[T]here is
evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley may play a role in increasing director liability by
altering the manner in which state courts view exculpatory statutes.”).
32. Martin Lipton et al., Risk Management and the Board of Directors, 42
BANK & CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REP. 150, 150 (2009).
33. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch.
2009).
34. Id. at 111–15.
35. Id. at 114–15, 127.
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suit, the court was not kind to the plaintiffs. First, and especially
pertinent to climate-change issues, the court took a dim view of
“business risk” as a suitable triggering context for fiduciary
responsibility. Caremark and Stone, observed the court, involved
losses deriving from serious employee misconduct or corporate
36
violations of law, not from business risk. The court opined:
To the extent the Court allows shareholder plaintiffs to
succeed on a theory that a director is liable for a failure to
monitor business risk, the Court risks undermining the well
settled policy of Delaware law by inviting Courts to perform a
hindsight evaluation of the reasonableness or prudence of
37
directors’ business decisions.

In elucidating this duty, did the Caremark court and the others
referred to in Citigroup focus largely on serious employee
misconduct and corporate violations of law simply because this was
the factual context of those cases?
Did Caremark actually
contemplate a broader scope of responsibility, one embracing
business risk as well as violations of law? For example, the
Caremark court spoke of the need for directors to be sufficiently
knowledgeable that they can “reach informed judgments concerning
both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business
38
performance.” Is this what the Citigroup court had in mind when
it observed that “it may be possible for a plaintiff to meet the burden
39
under some set of facts”?
At least technically, the Citigroup and Caremark courts allowed
that a plaintiff could successfully demonstrate a culpable failure to
monitor business risk “under some set of facts.” On the other hand,
the Citigroup court’s main message was largely in the negative, to
the point of describing business risk as “fundamentally different”
40
from employee misconduct and legal violations.
Essentially, the Citigroup court conflated the duty-ofcare/business-judgment-rule analysis with the duty-of-loyalty/badfaith analysis. Characterizing the case as actually a duty-of-care
case, although analyzing the matter under both duties, the court
talked largely about business-judgment “decisions” and business

36. Id. at 123–24.
37. Id. at 126. The court’s discussion of the business judgment rule and the
duty of oversight together reflected its view that “one can see a similarity
between the standard for assessing oversight liability and the standard for
assessing a disinterested director’s decision under the duty of care when [as
here] the company has adopted an exculpatory provision pursuant to §
102(b)(7).” Id. at 125.
38. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch.
1996) (emphasis added).
39. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 131.
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41

risk. In this regard, the judicial-restraint rationale of the business
judgment rule predominated in the discussion. This meant that
imposing liability based on a failure to monitor business risk would
undermine the purposes of the business judgment rule in protecting
the type of risk taking that lies at the heart of the free-enterprise
42
system. Delaware law was not meant to make directors liable for
“failure to predict the future and to properly evaluate business
43
At best, the court’s acknowledgement of the possibility of
risk.”
demonstrating a culpable failure by directors to monitor business
risk was noncommittal and skeptical.
If fiduciary liability is possible, in theory at least, the Citigroup
court gave no explicit positive guidance about what facts would
support a successful claim. Identifying what the court said the
plaintiffs did wrong and what the company’s directors did right,
however, is a logical place to start.
For example, the court characterized the plaintiffs’ allegations
as insufficient in that they were “conclusory” and not
44
They “[did] not even specify how the board’s
“particularized.”
oversight mechanisms were inadequate or how the director
defendants knew of these inadequacies and consciously ignored
45
It also appeared to be significant that “Citigroup had
them.”
procedures and controls in place that were designed to monitor
risk,” with a rather active and engaged committee that worked with
46
management and key outside advisers.
Without express guidance, it is not discernible whether
establishing procedures and controls directed by an active and
engaged committee would be an indispensable requirement or
merely a factor to consider. But a prudent board seeking to avoid
adverse legal consequences in the future would do well to consider
establishing a similar arrangement as the GHG regulatory web
becomes more complete or as physical impacts of climate change
become more specific and substantive.
2. Fiduciary Duty and Decision Making About Climate
Change
a. The Legal Framework. The fiduciary duty of oversight is
typically distinguished from the fiduciary duty of care on the basis,
among other things, that the latter controls liability for “decisions”
41. See id. at 123–31.
42. Id. at 130–31.
43. Id. at 131.
44. Id. at 127. The court also noted that American International Group,
Inc., v. Greenberg (In re American International Group, Inc., Consolidated
Derivative Litigation), 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009), provided a “stark contrast”
between the allegations presented in Citigroup and allegations that are
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 130.
45. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 128.
46. Id. at 127.
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made by a board. Directors are protected from liability for such
47
decisions by the process-oriented business judgment rule —a
“presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
48
company.”
b.

Applicability.

i. Decisions Whether to Take Strategic Action on Climate
Change. The basic approach of the business judgment rule, focusing
on the decision makers’ process rather than the substance of their
decision, provides considerable discretion. In that sense, directors,
to the extent they use a rational, informed decisional process, may
pretty much take (or not take) whatever action they choose
regarding corporate policy and practice on climate change.
Perhaps the most revealing language about the attitude of the
Delaware courts on the subject comes from Caremark:
[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact,
believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong
extending through “stupid” to “egregious” or “irrational”,
provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court
determines that the process employed was either rational or
employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate
49
interests.

Though strongly worded, this expression does not exaggerate the
50
scope of discretion accorded fiduciaries.
ii. Must Companies Adopt “Best Practices”? Environmental
advocates, along with corporations taking a proactive leadership
posture on climate change, typically urge corporate adoption of highquality standards of GHG management. They note the competitive
advantages and reputational benefits of such a practice, and they
believe that, in the long term, the benefits will far outpace the initial
51
and ongoing costs.
On the other hand, many corporate leaders and policymakers
balk at this notion, defending their position on the ground that the

47. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (“[T]he business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a
deep respect for all good faith board decisions.”).
48. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
49. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
50. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 cmt. note on directors’ liability 4
(2007).
51. See Steven Mufson, Push to Reduce Greenhouse Gases Would Put a
Price on Emitting Pollution, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2009, at D1 (describing
competing views about imminent legislation on climate change).
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increased costs related to achieving such a high standard entail
significant negative consequences. They assert that these harmful
consequences would occur at company-specific, industry-sector, and
ultimately macroeconomic levels. Further, they would add, the huge
capital investments required initially could turn out to be
inappropriate when the ultimate comprehensive regulatory scheme
52
is established.
State corporate law, because of the considerable discretion
accorded to directors, does not require that they adopt best practices
for GHG management. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in
Brehm v. Eisner:
Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance practices for
boards of directors that go beyond the minimal legal
requirements of the corporation law are highly desirable, often
tend to benefit stockholders, sometimes reduce litigation and
can usually help directors avoid liability. But they are not
required by the corporation law and do not define standards of
53
liability.

Hence, state corporate law, in the absence of positive climate
regulation, is not really an actor in the debate and discussion about
climate-change strategy.
Corporate planners should, however,
monitor emerging law carefully, as best-practices standards are
virtually always among the proposed regulatory models.
iii. Would Adoption of Best Practices Violate Fiduciary
Duties? While the question remains whether fiduciary-duty law,
unaccompanied by any legal-compliance strictures, requires
directors to adopt best-practices standards, proactive adoption of
such standards would not appear to be a real problem.
A shareholder complaining about adoption of (presumably more
costly) best-practices standards might claim that directors caused
the company to “waste” corporate resources. “To prevail on a waste
claim . . . the plaintiff must overcome the general presumption of
good faith by showing that the board’s decision was so egregious or
irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of
54
the corporation’s best interests.”
Following this standard, the Citigroup court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ waste claims based on the company’s subprime-related
investments, noting that “[t]he test to show corporate waste is
55
difficult for any plaintiff to meet.” On this analysis, given that a
52. See id.
53. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (emphasis added),
quoted in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n.399 (Del.
Ch. 2005).
54. White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001).
55. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del.
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corporate strategic decision in favor of a more costly, higher GHGmanagement model would likely be the result of a thorough and
considered process, fiduciaries should not be in danger of incurring
56
personal liability.
B.

Securities Law

Assertions that state corporate law applies to climate change
also have counterparts in federal securities law. But unlike the
views about state law, those about federal securities law and climate
change tend to be the subject of major initiatives. These initiatives
aim to pressure public companies into making more forthcoming
disclosures to the federal Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) and to the public.
The discussion below describes several prominent initiatives,
analyzes specific, potentially applicable disclosure provisions, and
then speculates about the future disclosure environment. Important
here is the fact that advocates are not just seeking immediate action
by public companies. They are also attempting to influence and
shape legal interpretations of existing law in their favor. While
strikingly few companies are currently making disclosures, these
initiatives, combined with evolving knowledge and values about
climate change, will gradually create a quite different legal culture
for affected companies.
1. Major Initiatives to Increase SEC Disclosure About Climate
Change
a. Legal Actions by the New York Attorney General: The Xcel
and Dynegy Settlements. In September 2007, New York Attorney
General (“NYAG”) Andrew M. Cuomo initiated an inquiry, pursuant
to Executive Law Section 63 and General Business Law Section
57
352, centering on the Xcel Energy (Xcel) and Dynegy companies,
among others. The Xcel inquiry concerned the adequacy of the
company’s disclosures to investors, including in its SEC filings, on
the “expected impact of climate change and the regulation of [GHG]
emissions on Xcel Energy’s operations, financial condition, and
58
plans to construct a new coal-fired electric generating unit.” The
Ch. 2009). See generally id. at 135–38 (analyzing plaintiffs’ waste claims).
56. See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994); William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–77 (1992).
57. N.Y. EXEC. L AW § 63 (McKinney 2002) sets forth the general duties of
the New York Attorney General and includes subsection 15, which provides
authority to accept “assurances of discontinuance” in settlement of matters
initiated by the Attorney General. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 1996)
provides certain authority to the Attorney General with respect to the
investigation of “fraudulent practices in respect to stocks, bonds and other
securities.”
58. Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15), In re
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59

Dynegy inquiry was similar.
Xcel and Dynegy ultimately agreed to settle, without admitting
or denying any violation of law or wrongdoing, by agreeing to
expand or continue relevant disclosures made in their annual Form
60
The four-year Xcel agreement (Xcel
10-K filings with the SEC.
Discontinuance) and the four-year Dynegy agreement (Dynegy
Discontinuance)
both
included
the
following
disclosure
requirements:
(1) Analysis of Financial Risks from Regulation (present and
61
probable future laws regulating GHG emissions).
(2) Analysis of Financial Risks from Litigation (“any” climatechange litigation that will “likely” have a “material financial effect”
62
on the company).
(3) Analysis of Financial Risks from Physical Impacts of Climate
Change (including “increase[s] in sea level and changes in weather
conditions, such as increases in extreme weather events, changes in
precipitation resulting in drought or water shortages, and changes
63
in temperature”).
(4) Strategic Analysis of Climate-Change Risk and Emissions
Management (extensive disclosure regarding the company’s position
on climate change, GHG emissions data, management strategies
and practices (and their results and expected future effects), and
64
relevant corporate-governance policies and practices).
From the wording of the Xcel Discontinuance, Xcel may have
been suspected of disclosing significantly less about climate-change
matters in its SEC disclosures than in its voluntary disclosures. For
example, the Xcel Discontinuance noted particularly the disclosures
the company made in response to a 2006 questionnaire from the
65
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and in other non-SEC disclosures.
Indeed, those disclosures provided information that essentially
66
After the
framed the nature and scope of the NYAG’s inquiry.

Xcel Energy Inc., AOD # 08-012, at 1 (Aug. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/aug/xcel_aod.pdf
[hereinafter
Xcel Discontinuance].
59. See Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15),
In re Dynegy Inc., AOD # 08-132, at 1 (Oct. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/oct/dynegy_aod.pdf [hereinafter
Dynegy Discontinuance].
60. Id. at 2–5; Xcel Discontinuance, supra note 58, at 2–5.
61. Dynegy Discontinuance, supra note 59, at 3; Xcel Discontinuance, supra
note 58, at 3.
62. Dynegy Discontinuance, supra note 59, at 3; Xcel Discontinuance, supra
note 58, at 3–4.
63. Dynegy Discontinuance, supra note 59, at 3–4; Xcel Discontinuance,
supra note 58, at 4.
64. Dynegy Discontinuance, supra note 59, at 4–5; Xcel Discontinuance,
supra note 58, at 4–5.
65. Xcel Discontinuance, supra note 58, at 1–2.
66. Compare id. at 1 (discussing, in paragraph A, the nature and scope of
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NYAG’s initial intervention, Xcel “provided more detailed
information about climate change risk in its SEC filings than in
67
The Xcel Discontinuance memorialized the
previous filings.”
parties’ ultimate agreement about appropriate disclosures.
In this regard, the NYAG’s inquiry may have been addressing a
typical pattern that has emerged in recent years. That is, many
companies reap the reputational benefits of appearing enthusiastic
and forthcoming about climate change in voluntary settings. But
those same companies may become discernibly more restrictive in
their SEC disclosures—wherein, of course, fuller disclosure could
have adverse market and liability potential.
This practice is apparently widespread. For example, it was
described in a review of SEC and other disclosure practices by the
68
The firm reviewed the 2008 10-K
law firm McGuireWoods LLP.
filings of approximately 350 companies included in the S&P 500,
S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indices across all ten
industry sectors represented in these indices. First, generally, the
review found that “very few companies outside the energy and
utility
industries
were
making
any
type
of
climate
69
change . . . disclosures in their SEC reports.” And as to disparate
disclosures, it appears that in non-SEC venues many companies go
as far as identifying climate change as posing “commercial risk,”
having a “likelihood of ‘significant impact,’” or being a “potential
material risk.” Yet these same companies’ SEC disclosures do not
70
address these critical, obviously “material” subjects.
Initiatives such as those of the NYAG put pressure on
companies to make fuller SEC disclosures. This is obvious from the
considerable publicity accompanying them. For example, NYAG
Cuomo announced the Dynegy settlement at a press conference
joined by former U.S. Vice President Al Gore. The settlement,
Cuomo said, will help “protect investors by ensuring disclosure of
potential financial risks that climate change may pose . . . [and will]
71
raise the bar in the industry.”

the NYAG’s inquiry), with id. at 2 (using identical language, in paragraph E, to
describe the information disclosed by Xcel to the CDP and in other non-SEC
disclosures).
67. Id. at 2.
68. JANE WHITT SELLERS ET AL., M C G UIREW OODS LLP, C LIMATE C HANGE
D ISCLOSURE : O UT WITH THE O LD ; I N WITH THE N EW ? (2009),
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/climate%20change
%20disclosure.pdf.
69. Id. at 1.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen. of N.Y., Attorney General
Cuomo, Joined by Vice President Gore, Announces Agreement with Major
Energy Company, Dynegy, Inc. (Oct. 23, 2008) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/oct/oct23a_08.html.
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b. SEC Petition. On September 18, 2007, a coalition of
nongovernmental organizations, state governmental officials and
entities (including state treasurers, comptrollers, and state
retirement pension funds), and others filed a petition with the SEC
entitled Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk
72
The SEC Petition “request[ed] that
Disclosure (“SEC Petition”).
the [SEC] issue an interpretive release clarifying that material
climate-related information must be included in corporate
73
disclosures under existing law.” Notably, the SEC Petition sought
an “interpretation” of “existing law,” thus reflecting the petitioners’
position that present law was a sufficient basis for requiring the
desired climate-risk disclosures and no new laws were necessary.
Accordingly, the petitioners used this position as the basis for the
following points:
(1) Current law requires public companies to disclose material
74
information about climate risk.
(2) The changing regulatory and physical environments related
to climate change are creating significant business risks for
75
public companies.
76
(3) Climate risk is increasingly important to investors.
77
(4) Currently, climate risk is not being adequately disclosed.
(5) The SEC should clarify corporate obligations to disclose
78
climate risk.
The NYAG settlements and the SEC Petition reflect substantial
advocacy by major actors. Certainly, the power wielded by these
actors, which is both political and economic, will weigh heavily on
the state of emerging attitudes, policies, and practices on climate
change in the corporate sector. From a legal standpoint, however,
the question whether federal securities law, by itself, compels the
sought-after action has not been decided authoritatively. The
following discussion offers some pertinent points for any analysis
leading to such a decision.
2.

Analysis of Pertinent Provisions

The SEC Petition identified several SEC disclosure provisions
that typically arise in discussions about climate change. In most of

72. SEC Petition, supra note 12. On June 12, 2008, the petitioners made a
supplemental filing with the SEC, reporting on recent developments pertinent
to the original petition. Letter from Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. et al., to
Florence E. Harmon, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (June 12, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-547-supp.pdf.
73. SEC Petition, supra note 12, at 2.
74. Id. at 13–21.
75. Id. at 21–34.
76. Id. at 34–44.
77. Id. at 45–51.
78. Id. at 51–56.
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these provisions, whether disclosure is required depends on the
extent to which a climate-change impact is sufficiently specific,
certain, and substantial to be important to investors. A close look
reveals that increased certainty about climate change—particularly
as reflected in express statements by some companies—may be
increasing the prospect that disclosure is legally required in certain
instances. In other situations, however, a substantial burden
remains to demonstrate the presence of sufficient specificity,
certainty, and substantiality to trigger legal disclosure
requirements.
a. Accounting for Contingencies (Under Financial Accounting
Standards Board (“FASB”) Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 5). Accrual of a loss contingency for financialstatement purposes depends on whether a liability or asset
impairment is “probable” and the amount of the loss can be
79
To the extent the facts warrant it,
“reasonably estimated.”
climate-related liabilities or asset impairments may arise as a result
of (1) violation of, or required compliance with, an existing climatechange law; (2) damage to someone else’s property, such as damage
because of weather-related climate-change events; (3) obligations
triggered by climate-change events, such as company obligations
based on insurance, guaranty, or other hedging transactions; or (4)
damage to a company’s own property by climate-influenced weather
80
events.
The challenge for this disclosure requirement is similar to that
for litigation disclosure, in that such elements as materiality,
damages, and causation (including specific demonstration and
81
attribution to the company) remain problematic in many instances.
b. Description of Business (Under Item 101 of SEC Regulation
S-K). Item 101 would require disclosure of the “material effects”
that compliance with environmental law “may have upon the
[company’s] capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position”
as well as disclosure of “any material estimated capital expenditures
for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its current
fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such further periods
82
as the registrant may deem material[].”
Obviously, once a valid regulatory measure exists, as is true in
an increasing number of cities, states, and countries, disclosure is
79. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, Statement of Fin.
Accounting Standards No. 5, para. 8 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2004). To
be “probable,” an event must be “likely to occur.” Id. para. 3(a). Even where the
test for accrual is not met, disclosure in the financial-statement notes may be
required. Id. paras. 9–12.
80. See id. para. 4.
81. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.c.
82. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2008).
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required.
c. Legal Proceedings (Under Item 103 of SEC Regulation S-K).
Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure by public companies
of major legal proceedings that could have a significant financial
83
The provision applies to major
impact on the company.
84
environmental proceedings.
“Materiality” and the size of the potential financial impact are
the formal elements in a company’s analysis here. Pivotal in that
analysis—and a typical weak link in climate-change litigation cases,
both in regard to standing and on the merits—is the question of
causation. Accordingly, a company may take the position that
disclosure of pending climate-change litigation is unwarranted
because a tenuous basis of causation makes a victory on the merits
unlikely. Alternatively, a company may disclose the litigation but
then characterize it as weak.
Notwithstanding the increased activity and prominence in the
area of climate-change litigation, it has been said that “[g]auging the
prospects of . . . pending climate change [litigation] is a precarious
85
Thus observed a report prepared by the Congressional
venture.”
Research Service entitled Climate Change Litigation: A Growing
Phenomenon (“CRS Report”). The CRS Report notes further:
In the conventional sense of the term, plaintiffs’ successes
have been rare in cases seeking relief directly from GHG
emitters. A court may be reluctant to impose expensive
measures to address a global problem on a defendant that is a
proportionately minor contributor (which almost all
defendants are, given the vast number of GHG emitters), using
statutory provisions or common law principles that were not
formulated with global problems in mind, against a backdrop
of scientific uncertainty as to the precise consequences (if not
86
the general cause) of climate change.

As noted earlier, causation is often a major problem, whether in
the context of legal standing or the merits. An “intractable problem
in environmental law [generally has been convincing courts to
impose] liability for harms that are remote in time and place from
the pollution sought to be abated, particularly where the pollution
87
comes from multiple sources.”

83. Id. § 229.103 (requiring disclosure of “material pending legal
proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business”).
84. Id. § 229.103 instruction 5.
85. ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A
GROWING PHENOMENON 33 (2008), available at http://www.communityrights.org/
PDFs/Warming%20Law/CRS_4_7_08.pdf.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 34; see RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
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In contrast to the previous genre of cases, pro-environmental
litigation seeking governmental remedies has tended to be more
successful. “In a much-publicized string of 2007 decisions under the
Clean Air Act, Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, foreign
policy authority of the United States, and [the National
Environmental Policy Act], courts have shown increased willingness
to authorize or require government consideration of climate
88
From a corporate perspective, these victories can have
change.”
potentially significant impacts.
For example, in Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S.
Department of the Interior, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia vacated a five-year federal Interior Department oil- and
gas-leasing program for failure of the government to consider
89
And although the court
environmental impacts properly.
remanded the case to the agency for proper environmental
90
analysis, and probably ultimate completion of the program,
potential business lessees suffer from costs related to the delay.
Additionally, the plaintiffs could well exacerbate the delay through
continued litigation initiatives.
d.
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations (Under Item 303 of SEC
91
The overall objective of the Management’s
Regulation S-K).
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations (“MD&A”) is well reflected in its title. It is to give
investors “an opportunity to look at the [company] through the eyes
of management by providing a historical and prospective analysis of
92
the [company’s] financial condition and results of operations.” This
objective, especially given the MD&A’s “particular emphasis on the
93
[company’s] prospects for the future,” makes it perhaps the most
potent climate-change disclosure provision at this juncture. What

5–15 (2004); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
563 F.3d 466, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Petitioners’ substantive theory of standing
[to sue about climate-change impacts] fails because [they] have not established
either the injury or causation element . . . .”).
88. MELTZ, supra note 85, at 33–34 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
508 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 2007); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529
F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge
Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007)).
89. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d at
489.
90. Id.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2008).
92. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act
Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, Investment Company Act
Release No. 16,961, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,436 (May 24, 1989).
93. Id.
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remains to be seen is whether the SEC will choose to require
companies to live up to the express language of the provision, as
well as the SEC’s own interpretations of it, on climate-change
matters.
More specifically, in the MD&A, companies “must identify and
disclose known trends, events, demands, commitments and
uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material effect on
94
financial condition or operating performance.” Moreover, “forward
looking information is required where there are known trends [or]
uncertainties . . . that are reasonably likely to result in . . . a
material impact on the company’s liquidity, capital resources,
95
revenues and results of operations.”
That this provision applies to “business risk” as much as legal
compliance is clear from its language. Additionally, this fact was
96
affirmed early on by the SEC in Caterpillar Inc. In Caterpillar, the
SEC found that the company had failed to make disclosures about
events deriving from economic policy changes that could in the
future have a material negative financial impact on the consolidated
company.
In 1989, the company’s Brazilian subsidiary, CBSA, had
reported disproportionately high net profits (compared to other
subsidiaries). But a significant component of those net profits
consisted of nonoperating items tied directly to Brazil’s troubled
97
economic environment. When Brazil’s new president “immediately
instituted sweeping economic and monetary changes,” Caterpillar
98
failed to disclose this development and its implications. The SEC
concluded that Caterpillar’s disclosures “should have discussed the
future uncertainties regarding CBSA’s operations, the possible risk
of Caterpillar having materially lower earnings as a result of that
risk and, to the extent reasonably practicable, quantified the impact
99
of such risk.”
The SEC Petition expresses the view that “information about
the scope of the challenges climate change poses to a specific
company, and whether its management is adequately prepared to
face those challenges, is precisely the type of information that the

94. Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act
Release No. 8350, Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,057
(Dec. 29, 2003) (emphasis added).
95. DIV. OF CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY BY THE DIVISION
OF CORPORATION FINANCE OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE REVIEW OF
THE
PERIODIC REPORTS OF THE FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES (2003),
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm.
96. See Caterpillar Inc., 50 S.E.C. 903, 912 (1992).
97. Id. at 904.
98. Id. at 905–08.
99. Id. at 912.
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market is now demanding about climate risk.”
The SEC’s view
appears to be similar, at least in general, when it observes that
companies “should identify and discuss key performance indicators,
including non-financial performance indicators, that their
management uses to manage the business and that would be
101
Thus, the language of the MD&A is clear,
material to investors.”
and so are the SEC’s interpretations of it. When the SEC and the
courts begin to consider the question of climate-change disclosure in
SEC filings, MD&A disclosure will probably be the most difficult one
to reject.
3.

Implications for Corporate Strategic Planning

As to the applicability of the securities laws to climate change,
the discussion above suggests that specific disclosure provisions may
or may not be relevant at this time. Over time, more of these
provisions will likely become applicable. But the real question is
what attitude the SEC and the courts will take about disclosure.
To the extent that they approach cases with a healthy but
inquiring skepticism, they will probably chart a gradual course
toward increasingly demanding disclosure. But if the ignorance and
unfounded skepticism about climate change that have hamstrung
progress in this area for many years carries the day, those asserting
claims will meet with real difficulty. A more rational consideration
that may play a role, whether or not it is expressly articulated, is
the quite legitimate concern about the economic impact of corporate
action. Always an element in the debate and discussion, and
frequently only a mere political stratagem, this concern looms even
larger than ever during the present global economic and financial
crisis.
Yet it is not this latter scenario of reluctance in legal
enforcement that will determine the future of corporate climatechange strategy. To the contrary, an influential community of
advocates, boosted by an ever-growing consensus about the need for
action, will continue its leadership role in setting the ground rules
for corporate policies and practices in this area. Securities law, by
contrast, will likely have an increasingly greater impact on
corporate action, but how much so will depend on the political will of
government and the advocacy of plaintiffs. The “take away”
message for the corporate community, therefore, is that it should
prepare for a new world of demanding climate-change standards,
whatever the source of the pressure animating the change.

100. SEC Petition, supra note 12, at 18.
101. Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act
Release No. 8350, Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,057
(Dec. 29, 2003).
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CONCLUSION
Climate change has emerged as an important consideration in
corporate planning today, and its profile appears likely to increase.
Because of its potential adverse impacts on companies, whether
through physical phenomena, regulation, or litigation, corporate
planners are being forced to act.
Whether corporate and securities law will play a role in this
emerging drama remains to be seen. The analysis in this Article
points to a minimal likelihood of state corporate-law significance in
the near future. Federal securities law—because of the SarbanesOxley Act, and perhaps boosted by substantial advocacy and
reactions to the present financial crisis—is likely to play a much
greater role. In the meantime, nonlegal forces, emanating from
politics, economics, and advocacy-driven public consciousness, will
provide the main impetus for corporate action.

